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PSB PROCEDURE FOR EVALUATION OF  
THE NATIONAL PSYCHOLOGICAL EFFORT

The President's directive of April 4, 1951 (establishing the Psychological Strategy Board) specifies that the Board "will report to the National Security Council on the Board's activities and on its evaluation of the national psychological operations, including implementation of approved objectives, policies, and programs by the departments and agencies concerned." The directive also states that the Director of PSB shall report to the Board "on his evaluation of the national psychological operations."

In a paper dated September 28, 1951, designed to clarify the role of the Psychological Strategy Board under the President's directive, the Board laid down that this evaluation should be "in terms of effective accomplishment of the national psychological effort."

In endeavoring to determine how best to carry out their responsibilities under the above provisions, the Director and Evaluation staff of the Psychological Strategy Board have come to the following conclusion:

That PSB should evaluate the effectiveness of the national psychological effort primarily in terms of its impact upon the peoples and governments of key areas in the present world struggle. In estimating "effectiveness," the basic criterion should be the degree of achievement of the objectives contained in approved national policies, and applicable to the areas under review.

PSB's function in the evaluation field plainly lies in the fact that it is charged with responsibility for the psychological effort as a whole, including both covert and overt aspects of our activities, and covering not merely information and propaganda, but

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the whole range of psychological programs carried out under the authority of State, the Defense forces, CIA, MSA, etc. Its special usefulness, therefore, lies in the fact that it can evaluate the whole picture. This can be done effectively only in the field - that is, by a geographical or area approach, which permits PSB to estimate the effect and impact of the total effort right where it is taking place, i.e., in the countries concerned, in the minds of the leaders and the peoples of these countries. In general, the evaluation work of PSB should help each of the constituent departments or agencies in their task of evaluating their own separate efforts by providing an over-all estimate of the effectiveness of the national psychological effort as a whole. Obviously, possibilities of this sort would be limited by practical considerations - smallness of PSB evaluating staff, etc. - and area priorities would have to be fixed by the Director or the Board. In attempting to devise a suitable method of carrying out this type of evaluation, we have been unable to find any adequate precedent, either in or out of Government. The following outline of procedure has been evolved and is submitted for the Board's consideration:

- ✓ 1. PSB's evaluation of the national psychological effort shall utilize to the maximum extent the facilities and resources of the participating departments and agencies. It should call upon the cooperation of the evaluation units within State, Defense, and CIA, and make the fullest possible use of work already done by these evaluation staffs.
- ✓ 2. Full use should also be made of other pertinent material available through the departments and agencies, including intelligence estimates, appropriate reports from the diplomatic missions including USIS, from MSA field offices, and from military aid missions.
- ✓ 3. To the full extent permitted by time limitations and by available funds, social science research techniques, public opinion

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surveys, etc., should be utilized. PSB should work closely with State, Defense, and CIA, and, in appropriate instances, with MSA, in developing mutually useful public opinion research projects.

✓ 4. These procedures are all essential, but they do not add up to an adequate method of evaluating our national psychological effort at the point where this effort matters most; much can be done here in Washington, but a certain amount of first-hand, on-the-spot investigation in key countries and regions will be required if we are to obtain anything like a true, over-all picture of the effectiveness of our psychological operations. It is proposed, therefore, to utilize a form of "task force" technique, whereby the Director would delegate a member of his staff to visit key areas. Such visits would not merely provide fuller information than could be gleaned from field reports; they would also be invaluable in giving PSB's evaluation personnel the direct, first-hand impressions or "feel" of an area or situation which is essential if our evaluation of the national psychological effort is to be more than a routine assembling of documents. Thus, the "task force" process here envisaged would have great educational value in building up PSB's capabilities for accurate and effective evaluation.

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The exact method employed will vary considerably according to the area to be visited and problems involved. (In some cases a special effort might be made to have the visit of the PSB evaluator coincide with the trip of a CIA inspector, for example.) In others, use could be made of specially qualified people (such as   chiefs) who have had a background of Government work, and who might be asked to watch out for certain things when traveling in a particular area. It is envisaged that the usual procedure

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would be for the evaluator to consult with as many qualified persons as possible. His conversations would, of course, include the Ambassador or Minister, and other appropriate officers of the diplomatic mission, Service attaches, CIA <sup>Senior</sup> Representatives in the area, etc. In making these informal contacts with American officials in the field, it should, of course, be made clear that the purpose of the visit is to seek their cooperation in obtaining a mutually helpful, overall, coordinated picture of the effectiveness of our psychological effort in that area, rather than to "investigate" any one particular operation.

✓ The main purpose of the evaluator's visit, however, would be to talk with other qualified people in the country concerned. Such people might include local political leaders and Foreign Office or other Government officers (not on an official basis, of course, but only when they can be contacted informally or socially), newspaper editors, educators, business men, American and other newspaper correspondents, radio commentators, and other key people in the area who can contribute to an assessment of the impact of our psychological operations there.

✓ 5. From the report brought back by this "on-the-spot" evaluator, combined with evaluation material in Washington, a draft estimate or evaluation would be prepared and submitted to a committee or working group that would include a representative of each of the departments or agencies in PSB, a representative of MSA, where appropriate, an area expert from inside Government, and an outside consultant, who would be a person of some stature with specialized knowledge of the subject or region. This working group or panel would criticize, comment on, suggest modifications to, or partially revise the draft report. It is not envisaged, however, that the evaluation panel would actually be responsible for producing the evaluation. Rather, the committee or working group

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would function as a means of enabling each department or agency to check on the report and make its views known. Final responsibility for the evaluation report, prior to its submission to the Board, rests with the Director.

✓ In presenting this proposal to the Board, it is recognized that the suggested procedure is frankly experimental, and it is anticipated that experience itself will reveal and develop ways of improving and perfecting PSB's evaluation technique.

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## ROUTING AND RECORD SHEET

**INSTRUCTIONS:** Officer designations should be used in the "TO" column. Under each comment a line should be drawn across sheet and each comment numbered to correspond with the number in the "TO" column. Each officer should initial (check mark insufficient) before further routing. This Routing and Record Sheet should be returned to Registry.

FROM:

PSB

NO.

PSB-E-4

DATE

5 June 52

| TO             | ROOM NO. | DATE       |         | OFFICER'S INITIALS | COMMENTS  |
|----------------|----------|------------|---------|--------------------|---|
|                |          | REC'D      | FWD'D   |                    |   |
| 1. TS/OPC      |          | 7 JUN 1952 |         | Rel                | <p>② to ③ The only questions arise with respect to passages marked on pp. 344. From our discussion with Mr. Brown I am confident that he fully understands the practical difficulty of tying our field activities in with his evaluation program at the detail level (case officers concerned with particular projects, etc.) However, the general approach to the problem as outlined in this draft is most welcome. DCT</p> |
| 2. PY: PY/EVAL |          |            | 10 June | DCT                |   |
| 3. PY/LCB:     |          |            |         |                    |   |
| 4.             |          |            |         |                    |   |
| 5.             |          |            |         |                    |   |
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